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"Occasional Labourers and Chronic Want": A
Review of The Truly Disadvantaged
CAROLE MARKS

University of Delaware
Black American Studies

The Truly Disadvantaged is an important book which brings
the subject of poverty back into the forefront of sociological
discourse. William Wilson's intent is to redirect its study by
simultaneously mounting challenges to the ideological orthodoxy of the left and of the complacency of the right. Throughout, he attempts to subtly reconstruct current debates and
controversies and to mould them into a form more palatable
to the skeptical, voting age masses. For those interested in
public policy formation, there is value in both the underlying
purpose of such an exercise and in much of its form. Though
the work is not meant as definitive, it does manage in a few
pages to address many topics which are important to our
understanding of poverty in the midst of plenty. Discussions
of the role of joblessness, the inadequacy of the welfare
dependency thesis, and the problem of institutional failure in
the schools are particularly insightful.
Yet the Truly Disadvantagedis not without warts and blemishes. It never fully breaks away from the shortcomings of previous articulations, generating in many instances more of a
modest proposal than a truly new understanding. The intent
of this critique, however, is not to detract from the acknowledged contribution of the original but to debate some of its
more problematic parts in the hope that discussion will further
the author's own call for new directions in the study of
poverty.
The most problematic section involves his discussion of the
"shrinking pool of marriageable and economically secure
men." On the surface, there is substance to what is essentially
a descriptive observation which suggests that female-headed

families are a consequence of poverty and demographic
change. Demographically, an existing sex imbalance at birth
within the black community is compounded by high rates of
incarceration and homicide to produce low rates of "eligible
men." In cities like New York and Washington, black females
outnumber males 25 to one. Economically, inner city industrial
job loss has disproportionately affected minority working populations. And finally, intact black families with employed
males have a much lower incidence of poverty than do female
headed ones. The problem is not the emphasis on men but the
decided neglect of women. Moreover, such a discussion is easily transformed into a cure which develops a kind of useful life
of its own and begs the question. As Hilda Scott suggests in
her work Working Your Way to the Bottom, simply finding an
employed man does not alter the exploitative character of
women's work itself. Indeed, given the number of working
women within so-called stable black families, it may well be
that it is their labor "that keeps families from falling into poverty" rather than the other way around. Indeed, Mary Jo Bane
has developed a concept of "reshuffling" to describe already
poor black families, who, by virtue of separation, become poor
female headed households, a pattern more evident in black
than in white families (Quoted in Baca-Zinn, 1988, p. 9). What
is needed, then, is a discussion of the problem of increased
wages for women as well as men, as well as more skills training
and greater assistance with day care.
To ignore or gloss over gender when seeking a policy alternative for the entire black community seems not only shortsighted but harmful to our ultimate understanding of the
relations between family and social structure. As Maxine BacaZinn has commented, "the economic demise of large numbers
of black men affects the meanings and definitions of masculinity and reinforces the public patriarchy that controls minority
women through their unequal dependence on welfare" (BacaZinn, 1988, p. 24). Centering the discussion on these issues
rather than the ambiguous one of "non-mainstream values"
would have made it more pathbreaking.
Further, the Male Marriageable Pool Index (MMPI) itself
does not work in the way that one might expect in two of the

four regions of the country examined. In the West, where there
is an admittedly small black population, it is shown that the
"substantial" pool of eligible men does not reverse the trend
of female-headed households, although we are told that they
are not the same kind of households. In the South, where
blacks are known to concentrate in low-waged, low-skilled
labor, the finding that families are intact as a result of these
"eligible" men is hardly worthy of celebration (Wilson, 1987,
p. 99).
The discussion of the passing of black role models with the
exodus of the black middle and working classes from central
city neighborhoods also seems somewhat forced. So Wilson
writes, "The very presence of these families during such
periods provides mainstream role models that help keep alive
the perception that education is meaningful, that steady
employment is a viable alternative to welfare, and that family
stability is the norm, not the exception" (Wilson, 1987, p. 56).
Forced because of Wilson's own inclusion of Bowles and Gintis's description of the school environment, an environment
that does not separate black middle and underclass areas. They
write, "Blacks and minorities are concentrated in schools
whose repressive, arbitrary, generally chaotic internal order,
coercive authority structures and minimal possibilities for
advancement mirror the characteristics of inferior job situations" (Wilson, 1987, p. 103). It is hard to imagine, in this
setting, honestly conveying to poor black children an impression that there is "a connection between education and meaningful employment" (Wilson, 1987, p. 56).
Moreover, the black middle class of the 1940s and 1950s
was, by all accounts, a tiny population. It was a population
that tried to stay as far away from the poor as it could get, in
a social sense, by establishing a protected enclave with exclusive clubs and churches (Landry, 1987, pp. 59-62), and by supporting mechanisms like tracking in the schools to keep the
student apart. While it may be correct to suggest that this population has left the inner city, whether they ever represented
significant role models for the "underclass" is problematic and
more attributable to what one reviewer called notions of "a
largely mythical past." Particularly so is the suggestion that

they might convey to the poor "the habit of waking up early
in the morning to a ringing alarm clock" (Wilson, 1987, p. 60).
Further, it is a somewhat romantic idea to label them as
"black middle class professionals." E. Franklin Frazier suggests, many of those who had money at that time did so by
virtue of participation in quasi-legal and illegal activites, a situation, one might add, that they shared with many emerging
immigrant groups. Black professionals of this time were often
living at the edge of poverty, a point also discussed by Landry
who indicates that "they occupied a very ambiguous position"
and that "their activities were severely circumscribed by the
racial norm of a still very segregated society" (Landry, 1987,
p. 50). They gained position, if at all, not from their practices
but from working second jobs (Landry, 1987, p. 51), from being
slum landlords or middlemen for mainstream enterprises. In
Philadelphia, for example, black undertakers, a distinguished
group within the community, would often exchange votes and
influence for the right to claim unidentified bodies at the city
morgue. The notion that this Gogolesque population would
have swayed the poor from a life of crime to good deeds by
example seems a bit overstated.
But more curious is the notion, perhaps more implied than
stated, that black middle and working class populations have
abandoned the inner city for exclusive suburbs or more affluent
peripheries, expressed at one point simply as "the large outmigration of nonpoor blacks" (Wilson, 1987, p. 50). We know
from most demographic accounts that black suburbanization
has, at best, been a minor movement even in these last decades
of expansion and that the black working class exodus has
trailed that of the middle class. Massey and Denton (1987), for
instance, conclude, "Some blacks may be moving to suburban
areas, but this movement does not seem to be related to their
socioeconomic characteristics

....

Either blacks are moving to

suburbs in numbers too small to make a difference, or suburbs
and central cities are qually segregated" (p. 823). These groups
have to be sure, migrated to the peripheral communities at the
edges of central cities but they have not gone alone. In Wilmington, Delaware, for example, a city that is over 60% black,
the poor live in every census track in which there is a sizeable

black population. In the most prestigious black area, 14% of
the population is below the poverty line. Further, in only two
of the 21 census tracts of the city are there exclusive concentrations of the poor, and in one of these there is a fairly high
racial mixture. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that
the poor who live in more affluent census tracts are any better
off than those who live in less affluent ones. What this suggests, more disturbing than what Wilson argues, is that the
decline has occurred in the midst rather than in the absence of
"verticle integration."
In a related way, Professor Wilson gives very little weight
to the political changes that have occurred in the decades of
"unprecedented prosperity," changes that directly affected
the working poor. He states, for example, given the most comprehensive civil rights legislation and the most comprehensive
antipoverty program in the nation's history, it becomes difficult
for liberals to explain the sharp increase in inner city poverty"
(Wilson, 1987, p. 30). Yet, in 1975, nearly 80% of the jobless
were eligible for unemployment compensation. After 1980,
changes were made in federal requirements reducing that figure to only 29%. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture's
food stamp program was cut by seven billion dollars and, once
again, eligibility requirements were changed. It is estimated by
Brown that in 1985 only 19 million of the more than 33 million
living in poverty were receiving food stamps. In 1982, alone,
one million children previously participating in school lunch
programs, were made ineligible. In a study of the homeless in
Delaware, it was found that "almost half-44%-of the total
said they had no income at all, including public assistance."
(Wilmington News Journal, April 19, 1988). Is it not possible
that these policy changes may have swelled the ranks of the
underclass, and also contributed to the rise in the crime rate,
regardless of isolation or role model demise?
And third, Professor Wilson is much persuaded by the
notion that the poor are "increasingly isolated socially from
mainstream patterns and norms of behavior." Indeed, his
apparent rejection of the "virulent liberal attack on Moynihan"
and acceptance of his "historical analysis" (Wilson, 1987, p. 21)
place him in the peculiar position of having to explain Moy-

nihan's contradictory argument that "because of housing segregation it is immensely difficult for the stable half (of the
Negro community) to escape from the cultural influences of
the unstable one" (Moynihan, 1965, p. 29).
Further, the "negative cultural influences" common to both
Wilson and Moynihan are disquieting because so much ethnographic research reveals that the poor are a lot more connected than we admit to the hopes and dreams of the dominant
society. Williams and Kornblum in the work, Growing Up Poor
found that the teenage mothers of their sample spend hours
and hours watching television, leading to the suspicion that
they get many more of their ideas about life from the media
than they do from each other. The authors found, for example,
a strong awareness by young drug dealers of the latest weaponry not from their community connections but from Clint
Eastwood movies.
This issue becomes particularly enjoined when one discusses the subject of having babies. The media is full of romantic notions of the joys of motherhood, values extolled hourly
in television commercials and in such recent movies as "Baby
Boom," "Three Men and a Baby," and "Having Babies." Is it
surprising that young girls in the absence of other badges,
translate these images into visions of their own self-worth? Or
that they fail to understand that nobody wants them to have
babies, not that having babies is bad per se?
Beyond the limits of these underlying themes, lies more
central questions which remain unanswered or only partially
answered. Are the truly disadvantaged a new population qualitatively different from the much larger group of working poor
of the present? Are race and inner city residence the key ingredients of the underclass? Is there a white underclass? If not,
how is it that a recent race-specific malady (i.e., occurring after
the role model exodus of the 1950s) is not generated by current
racism?
Initially, the message seems to be clear. There are differences in problems of welfare dependency, teenage pregnancy
and violent crime which set the underclass apart from the more
familiar, liberal versions of the deserving poor. The origins of

these differences are found in patterns of historic discrimination which were compounded by social isolation for those at
the bottom of the economic hierarchy. And that the solutions
to these problems must be achieved by expansive rather than
restrictive policies.
But towards the end, joblessness is presented as the root
cause of these "pathologies" suggesting either that the initial
cultural discussions (telling liberals things they did not want
to hear) were actually insignificant or that the poor with no
jobs behave less well (i.e., are more criminal) than those with
bad jobs. The former perspective would lead most liberals to
say, "where's the change?" and the latter to thrill the hearts
of conservatives who have always advocated forcing the poor
into employment of any kind, at any wage.
A similar uncertainty surrounds the issue of race. At first,
race seems somewhat incidental to the underlying structural
origins of the class. We are warned to not "rely heavily on the
easy explanation of racism" (Wilson, 1987, p. 19). In fact, evidence is presented which suggests that inequalities of similar
magnitude though not of strength affect a white population.
We are told, for example, that in 1978 74% of all poor black
families were headed by women and 39% of all poor white
families were as well. We could conclude from much of Wilson's own data, that whites are behind but catching up. As a
matter of fact, a recent study of violent crime by researchers at
Rutgers found that "the rural areas of the West, rather than
the American urban ghetto, is where youth is far more likely
to suffer violent death." The authors concluded, "Typically,
those counties had higher death rates among their white population than high-crime cities showed for urban blacks" (New
York Times, October 12, 1987, p. 13).
Of course, if whites are in the underclass then both the
historic discrimination and urban isolation explanations must
be recast to fit the contours of this mostly rural population
which has not been victimized by the same racial disadvantage.
This is a point Wilson, at times, seems unwilling to concede
as he argues, "Any abserved relationship involving race would
reflect, to some unknown degree, the relatively superior eco-

logical niche many poor whites occupy with respect to jobs,
marriage opportunities, and exposure to conventional role
models" (Wilson, 1987, p. 60).
The problem here may well be one of emphasis. But at the
same time, we are told that liberals must be brought to task
for being "unwilling to mention race when discussing issues
such as the increase of violent crime, teenage pregnancy, and
out-of-wedlock births." What it is that we should mention
about race in this connection is unclear. We are given James Q.
Wilson's "critical mass theory" which suggests that when the
numbers of young persons in a community reach a certain
point "a self-sustaining chain reaction is set off that creates an
explosive increase in the amount of crime, addiction and welfare dependency" (Wilson, 1987, p. 38). But a theory which
has as its basis the notion that too many young people (in all
examples black) produce bad things, at its best does not seem
very explanatory.
While The Truly Disadvantaged leaves some important concerns unanswered and unresolved, it does raise other issues
which spark the imagination. First, the whole spectrum of the
workings of the underground economy are suggested and
need to be examined. In the past, many people on welfare
supplemented benefit levels with employment; either of their
own or of a spouse/boyfriend. This "cheating" of the system
was viewed as necessary because formal employment was sporadic and uneven and because such things as health care benefits were not available for many of the working poor. In the
face of the loss of formal employment in inner city communities, has this alternative also been diminished or abolished? If
it still exists, must not the welfare system itself be seen as a
mechanism for sustaining marginal employment at least as
much as it is as a producer or conveyor of nonmainstream
norms of behavior?
The last point brings up the more general one of what we
truly know about the lives of these people. In our discipline,
we are particularly drawn in Berger's terms to a certain voyeurism in choices of topics to study (Berger, 1963). Departments are filled with courses on nuts and sluts-which not
only help dwindling enrollments but apparently encourage

some of the best work in the field. Lifestyles of the not rich
and infamous seem to peak our imaginations and numerous
examinations of out-of-wedlock, teenage pregnancies, street
crimes and school drop outs grace our shelves. The link
between lifestyles and poverty is always a tenuous one. Does
poverty create conditions which bring on certain attitudes
toward work and play? Are behaviors predominately found
among the poor, routinely or in proportions little better than
those which would be predicted by chance? We know very
little about how people make it in society, a question which
ultimately may be of greater significance than examinations of
how they fail.
In addition, we carry around a lot of potentially biased
information about how they live their lives. Professor Wilson,
for example, cites Oscar Newman's Defensible Space in discussing the fact that in poor areas "residents have difficulty identifying their neighbors. They are, less likely to engage in
reciprocal guardian behavior. Events in one part of the block
or neighborhood tend to be of little concern to those residing
in other parts" (Wilson, 1987, p. 38). Newman's work was
published as part of a grant from the Law Enforcement
Agency, investigating the need for the introduction of techniques of sophisticated surveillance. Does that affect the finding? It certainly contradicts the images of supportive
networking found in Carol Stack's work, All Our Kin (1974).
What happens to the money that is illegally funneled into
these communities? We are told that people are buying fancy
cars and clothes and teenagers are buying boom boxes and gold
chains as well as drugs. But are they also giving money to their
grandmothers to pay electric and rent bills? What does this say
about the ghetto economy and about the norms and values of
its residents?
What is the role and structure of the systems of extended
family and friends? Many biographies reveal successful
branches of underclass families as well as the inevitable, individual rags to riches sagas. Is there no contact between those
who make it within a family and those who do not? Wilson
indicates, "They also seldom have sustained contact with
friends or relatives in the more stable areas of the city or in the

suburbs" (Wilson, 1987, p. 60). Did they at some point have
more contact with the black middle class than with friends or
relatives?
What is the basis of the difference in these groups, class
role models, a caring and hardworking parent, religion, luck?
We know, although as sociologists we sometimes forget, that
people do not actually live in census tracts. Do they leave their
neighborhoods to shop, to work, to play?
But perhaps most importantly, we need to expand our
study of the truly disadvantaged from a domestic to an international arena. Professor Wilson is writing about the wretched
of the earth, "groups marginalized by the market mechanisms
of capitalist society." According to Dahrendorf, industrialization brought on the abolition of the system of norms and values
which guaranteed and legitimized the order of preindustrial
society, an order "endowed by the patina of centuries." In its
stead, classes arose defined by the crude indices of possession
and nonpossession, with the emphasis placed on economic
function rather than behavior. Classes, according to classical
definitions, were formed in this stage only in so far as they
were engaged in a common struggle with another class, and
as the identity of their interests produced a community and a
political organization. The "underclass" in most of our current
formulations hardly constitutes a class in this sense but rather
represents an "unstable entity" which may yet be formed but
presently plays a more significant role in attempting to overcome the various crises of the economic system.
In this guise, there are striking parallels to our study of the
underclass in the United States and the formation of certain
ethnic minorities in Western Europe. As Stephen Castles
points out, from 1945 until the midseventies, the import of
labor power was a marked feature of all economically advanced
countries (Castles, 1984). Estimates are that over 30 million
people entered the Western European democracies as workers
or workers' dependents after Wordl War II. Not all remained,
indeed net migration increased by about 10 million by 1975 and
to 16 million by the mid 1980s.
It is not necessary to describe the social costs associated
with such movements but only to point out that the costs were

often differentially distributed among certain sectors of the
indigenous working class as well as the elderly and the unemployed. Migration was seen as a cause of their problems and
campaigns to expel the newcomers were numerous. Obviously
each country represented a specific case where social, democratic and economic conditions affected what went on, from
Sweden's fairly liberal settlement policy to West Germany's
fairly restrictive one. Race also played a complicated and varied
role. But beyond the particulars, were significant common
threads. First, the economic moment in which migrations occur
represents a stage of development, with the transformation of
mass production and the deskilling of labor. Second, new jobs
are created which are often dirty, unhealthy, unpleasant and
it is to these, in particular, that migrants are recruited. Similar
to the period of the 1920s in the United States, a period of
homogenization occurred in Western Europe after the war,
characterized by worker substitutability and exploitation.
But as all good things come to an end, in the United States
the development of automated systems in the 1950s and the
movement of capital to labor, a pattern duplicated in Europe
at a later period, made these populations obsolete. By the midseventies in Europe, restrictive policies were found in all countries again with only slight variation.
But the cessation of recruitment did not end the presence
and in all countries new ethnic enclaves emerged, filled with
groups characterized by nationality, often physical traits, culture, and lifestyles distinct from the indigenous populations.
Their numbers, though not approaching the concentrations of
minorities in the United States, were not inconsequential. In
1981, for example, foreign born populations comprised 9.4%
of the population of West Germany, 5.1% of the population of
France, 5.4% of the population of Yugoslavia and 11% of the
population of Spain.
And in an all too familiar set of results, there are today
large concentrations of impoverished populations living in
inner-city areas and an upsurge of racism, fears of the destruction of national culture, the growth of neo-nazi movements and
strong beliefs that immigrants are the cause of economic uncertainty and should be returned. There are frequent media dis-

cussions of foreigners who take away other workers' jobs,
sponge off the welfare state, and exposes of minority youth
and their threats to public order, their criminality and drug
proliferation. In short, the makings of a dangerous underclass,
yet one without slavery, the absence of mainstream role
models or the vestiges of historic discrimination, to reveal its
source.
Their inclusion in the model need not "leave unexplained
the question of why black unemployment was lower not after
but before 1950" (Wilson, 1987, p. 30) and expand the discussion of the disadvantaged to the true parameters of "chronic
want" which have disturbed us at least since the days of
Charles Booth.
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